New Book: Chronicle of Chiang Khaeng: A Tai Lü Principality of the Upper Mekong by Volker Grabowsky and Renoo Wichasin
By Naw Liang

Mai soong kha.
It has been slow slogging with my research and writing for the All about Shan Studies blog recently. Maybe it's summer, which is supposed to be slow and perfect for study, but has proved to be even more busy than ever. However, I continue to have my eyes open for Shan information and news, while recent topics of interest - these include waving the flag for Shan nationalism and editing my last (way back in 2007 now) journey to Shan, Wa and Kokang States - continue to move forward, though slowly. More to come, I promise.

The following is a short summary of a recent academic publication focused on the Tai Lü - one of the many Tai groups - and the Chiang Khaeng kingdom that existed until the mid- to late-19th century on the eastern banks of the Upper Mekong River; this area is now the modern-day northern Lao PDR region of Luang Namtha. Author and academic Volker Grabowsky creates a distant link (see original posting here) between the Tai Lü kingdom of Chiang Khaeng and the Shan by stating that the "...ruler Cao Fa Sili Nò transfered the capital first from (Ban) Chiang Khaeng to Müang Yu (situated west of the Mekong in what is now [Shan State] Burma). From there the ruler's seat was finally moved to Müang Sing. Around 1887 more than 1,000 people were resettled from Müang Yu and other areas into the new capital of Müang Sing [which is located further east from the Mekong (see map here)]." Although tenuous, finding any link to Shan and the Shan State - historical or otherwise - is worthy of our interest. So, with a plausible link between these Tai groups, we take a deeper look at this new book.

Summary
Volker Grabowsky's and Renoo Wichasin's monograph 'Chronicle of Chiang Khaeng: A Tai Lü Principality of the Upper Mekong', published by the Center of Southeast Asian Studies, University of Hawai‘ii, is an important text for Upper Mekong studies. Described in a deeply and adeptly researched manner that goes beyond merely chronicling and translating four Lü chronicles, Grabowsky and Wichasin should be proud. Multilingual Grabowsky and Wichasin's text highlights an entrancing history, peppered with their recipe of meticulous footnoted annotations and in-depth research. The end result is a history that goes beyond this one principality in northwestern Laos and strives to discuss the interpolitics of power between the varying chiang and chao throughout the Upper Mekong, including modern Shan State. They touch on the Buddhist ethics of resident cultural centres, detailing varying concepts of hierarchy - tributes, regalia and pomp - as well as the results of elite decision-making, which include the brutal relocation of local populations caused by constant battles for human resources. This is gold for Shan-focused social/cultural anthropologists. Grabowsky and Wichasin also discuss myth and history, including juicy passages on sibling and spousal rivalries, Tai networking through intermarriage and how the elite use and abuse political alliances. Furthermore, the authors include key effects and events of the arrival of the British and French as well as growing engagement with China and Siam - first via earlier autonomous city states and eventually through the kingdom as a whole. Grabowsky and Wichasin also manage, masterfully, to paint Chiang Khaeng as a poster child South East Asian river state with multiple rulers and complex (and intertwined) histories. Comparisons and discussions of similarities to other kingdoms, such as those in neighbouring moder-day Shan State, are a distinct possibility.

The University of Hawai'i Press called 'Chronicles...a model of translation skill and historical acumen at its finest.' I cannot wait to get my hands on one to investigate the possible (and existing) links to and like comparisons with Shan kingdoms of the past. That, and to check to see if my 'summary' holds up to scrutiny.

Until next time,

Naw Liang

Do dams = development? And for who?
Chinese ventures into Shan State
By Naw Liang (London, UK and Kanazawa, Japan)

Mai soong kha!
It has been a while since my last post, but not for lack of effort or material. It appears that there has been a plethora of Shan-related activity, particularly in the UK with the SCA_UK. More on that to come...

After a very, very long time, I was flipping through my email - if you can flip them - and came across some older correspondence with an acquaintance Kevin Woods, a gifted researcher who spent considerable time in Chiang Mai, with extended periods in upper Burma/Myanmar (Shan State and, more often, Kachin State) to research, highlight, campaign on forestry and political/social ecology issues in the Mekong Region. (For an exmaple of Kevin's work, please read this report for the Foundation for Ecological Recovery in Bangkok, Thailand.) While I regret having (somewhat) lost touch with him, I do know that he is a PhD student at University of California, Berkeley. Despite the gap, I wish wish him well...

Chinese dams in Shan State
But, back to my original thought. Kevin's email discussed the ecological impact of the Chinese and their infrastructural development, particularly dams, key issues in his field. My own subsequent (and short) research unearthed some disconcerting information about the Chinese influx into Shan State in in ecological terms.

The 大波浪 (dabolang; tsunami) of Chinese - persons, business, culture and influence - into northern Burma, including Shan state, is widely known and publicised (see examples of articles here and here), the vast majority revolving around trade, both legal and the other kind - natural resources, including timber (see UNPO report on illegal logging here), minerals, gems (particularly jade) and more as well as smaller manufactured goods. However, I was unaware of the other 'resources' that are being bilked from Burma/Myanmar, namely hydroelectric power from dams built on the Mekong, the Salween and other major rivers that flow through and service Shan State.

The Tasang Dam, Chinese-built for Chinese benefit
A semi-recent report in S.H.A.N. News illustrated the growing concern. The Tasang Dam, a project on the Salween River in south central Shan State (see general map here), is progressing along 'nicely' with some 60 pillars constructed by Chinese engineers. The massive pillars, which are up to 30 yards long, line both sides of the Salween. Construction started in November 2007 when 40 Chinese engineers (they now number approximately 150) began work on the site: explosions to clear debris were heard for some time as the site is difficult for heavy machinery to reach (there are few roads and those that due exist are often impassable). And, along with the engineers, an ever-present platoon of 50 Burma Army Light Infantry Battalion (LIB) soldiers watch over the site; they have also cleared and set up a site nearby to provide 'security'.

The dam itself is a significant undertaking, being the largest of a proposed 'series' of hydroelectric projects on the Nu/Salween Rivers in Shan State: the dam, when completed, will produce 7,110-megawatts of power, rise 228m from its base and be, in effect, the tallest dam in all of Southeast Asia. However, impressive as they may seem, many are concerned about its construction, most vocally Salween Watch, an coalition NGO established in Chiang Mai in February 1999 to highlight and confront a variety of Burma-related and environmental issues.

More projects to come: their impact on the Shan
Now, I will leave the Tasang Dam issue here; I am certain that Salween Watch and a variety of other NGOs and independent researchers have produced more lucid, detailed and professional analyses than I ever could here. One report that I would particularly recommend is found on the Burma Rivers Network: Undercurrents - Monitoring development on Burma's Mekong (April 2009). Sharing that...

I do, however, need to draw attention to another, largely overlooked issue: the deliberate misopportunity/handicap that the dam presents to the Shan and Shan State and the lack of outrage against it. While rampant and unyielding scorn by the Burmese junta towards the Shan appears to have supersaturated our perspective (and voice) into a coma. Chinese endeavours, however contracted out by (and profitable for) the SPDC, represent new disdain on an economic and environmental this time. It is almost a given that any power by-products from the dam will supply the thirsty Chinese grid and wholly ignore the needs (first) and sucor (second) of the Shan State where it is resident; some predict that power may even boost the teetering Burmese power system, though whether or not it could withstand the surge is another question. While this may be the obvious reality, it is discouraging to see a disproportionately small and silent voice against such 'development', particularly from the expatriate Shan communities who must be abreast of this issue, but remain largely silent. Have they (we) finally become so detached, so numb, so apathetic that issues not only as important as the environment, but also as crucial as the provision of basic services and the right to benefit from local sources are cast aside without so much as a whimper? While I seldom forget (and take for granted) the advantages that surround me in London - heating and lighting; access to the internet; the freedom to a telephone; the 'right' to ask for more - it only takes a few days when visiting the Shan State to be reminded of their importance in improving the quality of life, if only to benefit from nifty gadgets and complain and wish for more.

Alright, I am getting off topic here. The most important issue here is visibility - keeping eyes and minds on the critical issues - while endeavouring to combat complacence in the face of years of limitations. The Tasang Dam will be completed, complaints voiced and heard or not. Many others will follow, each forever changing a part of the Shan State landscape. But, that does not mean that they have to go ahead without a discussion, however external and removed from the key players, amongst those that truly care.

Talk again soon,

Naw Liang